Incommensurability and multi-paradigm grounding in design science research:Implications for creating knowledge by Hovorka, Dirk S.
Bond University
Research Repository
Incommensurability and multi-paradigm grounding in design science research
Hovorka, Dirk S.
Published in:
Human Benefit through the Diffusion of Information Systems Design Science Research: IFIP WG 8.2/8.6
International Working Conference, Perth, Australia, March 30 - April 1, 2010. Proceedings
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-12113-5_2
Published: 01/01/2010
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Hovorka, D. S. (2010). Incommensurability and multi-paradigm grounding in design science research:
Implications for creating knowledge. In Human Benefit through the Diffusion of Information Systems Design
Science Research: IFIP WG 8.2/8.6 International Working Conference, Perth, Australia, March 30 - April 1,
2010. Proceedings (Vol. 318, pp. 13-27). (IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology; Vol.
318). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12113-5_2
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 07 May 2020
Bond University
ePublications@bond
Information Technology papers Bond Business School
3-30-2010
Incommensurability and multi-paradigm
grounding in design science research: Implications
for creating knowledge
Dirk Hovorka
Bond University, Dirk_Hovorka@bond.edu.au
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/infotech_pubs
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you by the Bond Business School at ePublications@bond. It has been accepted for inclusion in Information
Technology papers by an authorized administrator of ePublications@bond. For more information, please contact Bond University's Repository
Coordinator.
Recommended Citation
Dirk Hovorka. (2010) "Incommensurability and multi-paradigm grounding in design science
research: Implications for creating knowledge" International Federation of Information Processing
(IFIP) working group 8.2 + 8.6: Human benefit through the diffusion of IS design science research.
Perth, Western Australia.Mar. 2010.
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/infotech_pubs/123
   
1 
 
Incommensurability and Multi-paradigm Grounding in Design 
Science Research: Implications for Knowledge Creation 
 
Dirk S. Hovorka 
Bond University 
Gold Coast  
QLD AU 
+61 7 5595 2244 
dhovorka@bond.edu.au 
 
ABSTRACT 
The ‘problem identification-design-build-evaluate-theorize’ structure of Design Science 
Research has been proposed as an approach to creating knowledge in information systems and in 
broader organizational and social domains. Although the approach has merit, the philosophical 
foundations of two specific components warrant attention. First, the grounding of design theory 
on potentially incommensurate kernel theories may produce incoherent design theory. In 
addition, the newly design theory has no strong logical connection to the kernel theories, and so 
cannot be used to test or validate the contributing kernel theories.  Second, the philosophical 
grounding of evaluation may inadvertently shift from functionally-based measures of utility and 
efficiency, to evaluation based on the pragmatic fulfillment of multi-dimensional human actions 
as people encounter information systems, resulting in evaluation errors. Although design and 
evaluation from a single paradigm is not desirable, sufficient, or representative of design science 
research, multi-paradigm grounding of design and evaluation must be realized and used 
consciously by the research community if the design science approach is to remain a legitimate 
approach to knowledge creation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence and influence of Design Science Research (DSR) as a distinct research 
approach in Information Systems (IS) is gathering significant attention. IS as a discipline has 
always contained a significant intellectual focus on designing systems for functional goals, and 
the emergence of DSR lends legitimacy and credibility to the generative aspects of IS. But the 
suggestion that DSR has “become a new way of creating and studying phenomena where 
understanding comes from building solutions to solve problems” (IFIP  8.2 + 8.6 2010 Call for 
Papers; emphasis added) has a number of important implications that warrant discussion. 
Although the conceptualization of DSR is under discussion and is still evolving, 
convergence on a number of central tenets and a general structure of ‘problem identification-
build-evaluate-theorize’ (Winter 2008) is emerging. The primary design/build – justify/evaluate 
phases suggested in Hevner et al. (2004) have been expanded by Baskerville et.al. (2007) and the 
potential benefit of interpretive approaches (Niehaves 2007) has been suggested. In addition, the 
importance of extending design to the user-as-designer (Germonprez et al. 2007; Hovorka and 
Germonprez 2009) and expanding evaluative criteria of DSR (Baskerville et al. 2007) are 
gradually influencing the DSR community to incorporate a broader view. The coalescence of a 
community of researchers with shared problem domains, exemplars, methods, and evaluative 
criteria has led some to consider DSR to be achieving paradigmatic status (Hevner et al. 2004; 
van Aken 2004).  As such, there is interest in how the DSR approach and structure can be 
diffused to a wider context of organizational and societal needs to create knowledge by building 
working solutions to problems. DSR seeks to create knowledge in the form of technological rules 
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(Bunge 1967; van Aken 2004) which are composed of explicit prescriptions for building an 
artifact with an expected performance or outcome in a specific problem domain (Gregor and 
Jones 2007). Humans have long created technological rules or models intended to achieve goals 
including artifacts (in a broad sense), social processes, and organizational interventions and 
structures. Critically, technological rules must be grounded in the natural and behavioral sciences 
to produce coherent knowledge claims (Goldkuhl 2004; van Aken 2004).  
As DSR becomes reified into a set of guidelines (Hevner et al. 2004), and design theories 
are evaluated against a particular anatomical structure (March and Smith 1995; Gregor and Jones 
2007), the emphasis begins to approach a dominance of method over science (Nietzsche 1968). 
These guidelines and structures are used to define the differences between DSR and paradigms of 
knowledge production such as the natural and behavioral sciences (Hevner et.al 2004) and 
alternative systems design paradigms (Hirschheim and Klein 1989; Butler and Murphy 2007). 
This paper seeks to shift the focus away from the method of DSR, to a deeper consideration of 
the philosophical assumptions underlying knowledge claims resulting from the DSR approach.  
The goal of this research is to reinvigorate discussion of the philosophical foundations by 
which the DSR approach creates and evaluates knowledge. By peering underneath the guidelines 
and structure which are becoming dominant in DSR, to examine foundational concepts in the 
creation and refinement of scientific knowledge, researchers will better prepared to justify their 
choice and use of kernel theories and the evaluation of their knowledge claims.  
 To focus this discussion, this research focuses on two aspects that have received little 
attention: 
1. Potential incommensurability in the selection, use, and interactions of 
kernel theory in DSR, and subsequent implications for kernel theory validation. 
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2. The shift in our conceptualization of evaluation implied by a ‘building 
solutions to solve problems’ approach. 
The paper begins by examining issues of incommensurability and implications for the 
choice of kernel theories in DSR. Next, it reframes the nature of DSR as producing knowledge 
which mediates, rather than solves, problems. In doing so, the research specifically points to the 
phenomenon of secondary design to demonstrate the potential issues of incommensurate 
paradigms in evaluation. The paper concludes with a call for greater attentiveness to the 
philosophical foundations, rather than the method, by which DSR makes knowledge claims. 
KERNEL THEORY SELECTION AND COMMENSURABILITY  
Design Science has long recognized that design theories are composite theories whose 
kernel theories (March and Smith 1995) or justificatory knowledge (Gregor and Jones 2007) are 
derived from reference disciplines. These kernel theories serve a dual purpose: first, they provide 
the often informal hypotheses that a given design principle will produce the desired phenomenon, 
and second, they are the target of extension and refinement rather than disconfirmation through 
the generate/test cycle of DSR (Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2008). The refinement and extension of 
kernel theory is claimed as a key contribution of the DSR approach. It has been suggested that 
DSR is inextricably bound to the inclusion, testing and improvement of kernel theories (Kuechler 
and Vaishnavi 2008), and that artifact development relies on kernel theories which are applied, 
tested, modified, and extended through the creation of artifacts (Hevner et al. 2004). However, 
little attention has been paid to either the potential problems resulting from selection of kernel 
theories from paradigmatically distinct origins, or how a new design theory can be used to test a 
kernel theory upon which it is somehow based. Refinement of kernel theories, and evaluation of 
the resultant design theory, becomes problematic if the causal contributions and interactions of 
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the kernel theories cannot be compared against a shared measurement. In raising the question of 
kernel theory incommensurability, it is assumed that theory incommensurability and concept 
incommensurability are salient (Kuhn 1977; Burrell and Morgan 1979; Andersen et al. 2006) and 
have not been cast aside.  
The principles of design are frequently drawn from multiple disciplines. For example, 
Germonprez et. al. (2007) was grounded in principles from information systems, computer 
science and Human Computer Interaction, in addition to architecture, music, and cybernetics. 
Each of these disciplines contributed to the proposed theory of Tailorable Technology. The 
theory of Organizational Memory Information Systems (Stein and Zwass 1995) was grounded 
upon a model of organizational level effectiveness and a model of individual level memory. As a 
third example, the theory of Learning-Oriented Knowledge Management Systems (Hall et al. 
2003) was grounded in Churchman’s (1971) theory of inquiring systems  and Simon’s (1969)  
intelligence-design-choice model as kernel theories (Walls et al. 2004). Interestingly, none of 
these design theories discussed the appropriateness of combining theories which account for 
phenomenon at different levels of analysis (organizational vs. individual) or in distinctly different 
disciplines (organizational behaviour vs. psychology; architecture vs. HCI). This raises a question 
of two potential types of philosophical conflict: combining incommensurate theory derived from 
different methodological or ontological assumptions (Kuhn 1977), and combining 
incommensurate concepts in which conceptual meaning varies between disciplines (Andersen et 
al. 2006). 
The Problem of Incommensurability 
Incommensurability is a concern in many disciplines with pluralist traditions. It defines a 
relation between entities and raises a potential problem for combining paradigms, theories, and 
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concepts. A full discussion of the ongoing debate on incommensurability is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but a synopsis will provide a perspective on the problem and its relevance to 
grounding in DSR. Incommensurate theories come from ontologically distinct paradigms, such 
that the theories are mutually unintelligible. Two distinct theories representing systems of 
orientation (e.g. methods, paradigms) are considered incommensurate if they present conflicting 
perspectives about possible actions or language, and an acceptable reference system from which 
to evaluate both theories is lacking (Scherer 1998). There exists no common measure by which to 
determine the appropriateness of each theory, and the result of combining these theories as 
justificatory knowledge for a new design theory would be incoherent. Thus, a theory based on the 
symbolic meaning attached to an information system by users and it’s subsequent use patterns is 
incommensurate with a theory positing the independent material variables contributing to a 
dependent variable measured as system performance.  It is meaningless to refer to the cognitive 
sense-making of material variables, and unwarranted to look for causal-mechanical explanation 
of human subjective understanding of systems. Suggesting that these are incommensurate as 
kernels for design theory does not to privilege one theory over the other. Each in its own right 
may provide a foundation for new design theory. But we should place a critical eye on combining 
paradigmatically incommensurate kernel theories in DSR, as they constitute entirely different 
views of the world. Furthermore, to suggest that kernel theories may be incommensurate does not 
contradict the value of pluralism in research (Mingers 2001), as mixed method studies are 
intended to discover truths about the world, not to build  novel artifacts. The role of theory in 
discovery research is quite distinct from the role of kernel theory in DSR.   
Kernel theory selection is another rarely examined area, in which we are faced with the 
question of which theories will best serve as kernels for DSR. Kuhn (1962) suggests that the 
   
7 
 
evaluation of good theory be based on accuracy, simplicity, scope, consistency and fruitfulness. 
But Kuhn (1962) recognises the inherently social and practical underpinning of these criteria. 
There is no objective measure by which to determine which theories would best serve as kernels 
for new designs.  The approach used by  Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2008) diminishes this problem 
by drawing kernel theory from experimental results in domains (e.g. cognitive and social 
psychology and education) closely associated with the problem domain of the designed artifact. 
But even with such an approach to reducing the potential problems of incommensurability, we 
are unable to claim that these kernel theories are the best theories upon which to base design 
research. For every set of selected kernel theories, there exist alternative kernel theories from 
which design knowledge could potentially be developed for the same problem space. This 
discontinuity between the subjective selection of kernel theory and the desired functionalist 
evaluation of design theory places a significant burden on the evaluation of all knowledge 
contributions made by a DSR approach.   
Also salient is conceptual or linguistic incommensurability of similar terms drawn from 
different reference disciplines. Although there are multiple theories of concepts,  some consensus 
suggests that conceptual incommensurability varies in degree and importance, but does occur 
between cognitively derived human conceptual structures (Andersen et al. 2006). Much of the 
debate has revolved around conceptual changes over time within a single discipline, but the 
problem also exists as concepts are imported across disciplinary boundaries. Two potential 
problems arise here. First, not recognising differences in concepts is likely to result in an attempt 
to relate, in a theoretical manner, two ideas that are individually coherent and clear but are not in 
any way associated. Second, as the evaluation phase attempts to refine kernel theories, the 
researcher will have lost the ability to distinguish between the concepts and will be unable to 
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resolve the antecedents of the artifact’s success onto the contributing concepts. For example, the 
concept of information may refer to the mathematical telecommunications concept, to a human 
psychological construct, to an object that can be stored, transmitted, retrieved (Buckland 1991),  
or to a description about, for, or as reality (Borgmann 1999). The term process is multi-
conceptual depending on context (e.g. process records; process redesign; the system development 
process). Thus, the seemingly simple combination of information and processing across 
references disciplines (information processing in computer science versus psychology) refer to 
different activities and constructs and illustrates the potential difficulties of concept 
incommensurability. 
It should be emphasized that incommensurability does not preclude successful design. 
Indeed, there are examples of artifacts that work without researchers understanding how or why. 
But the distinction between DSR and design practice, is the former’s emphasis on the knowledge 
resulting from design and evaluation, versus the latter’s desire to simply fulfil a functional goal. 
An incoherent design theory from DSR is not a knowledge contribution inasmuch as it may result 
in functional but atheoretic instantiations. 
Solutions or Mediations: An Evaluative Shift 
A significant rhetorical issue stems from the focus of DSR on creating solutions to 
problems. This focus is reflected in the language that the paradigm of DSR “seeks a solution to a 
real-world problem of interest to practice” (Kuechler and Vaishnavi 2008 p 492) and is relevant 
to the question of incommensurability in DSR evaluation. If we turn to the definition of solution, 
as “the resolution of a difficulty or the solving of a problem”
1
 we see that few technologies 
                                                          
1
 http://define.com/solution 
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actually resolve or eliminate a problem at all. For example, a hammer does not solve the problem 
of building houses or even driving nails. Although it is a tool that allows a carpenter to more 
easily drive nails, the process of driving nails still needs to be accomplished.  So we modify the 
artifact and produce different types of hammers for different contexts and even embrace the 
compressed-air nail-gun for greater efficiency and efficacy. But this new technological solution 
does not work in all circumstances. The nail driving problem is multi-dimensional and the larger 
problem of connecting timbers to build houses still exists. The designed artifact creates a more 
useful state of affairs (Angell and Ilharco 2004) than previously existed,  but does not resolve the 
root problem with a solution. 
If we look at other professional disciplines to which IS is often compared, we can see that 
their activities do not claim to resolve or eliminate root problems. Rather, they provide a means 
for humans to mediate or reduce the impacts of those problems. Laws and legal procedures do not 
solve the problems of crime, inequality, or breeches of contract. The legal frameworks do provide 
mechanisms for managing problems when they arise on a case by case basis. In a similar manner, 
neither does medicine solve the problems of disease, traumatic injury, or pain.  To suggest that 
DSR seeks to design information technology artifacts as a solution to a problem implies 
permanent resolution of the problem that requires no future modification of the tools as designed. 
But laws, medicine, information technology, and even hammers, undergo large scale revision and 
a continuous series of localized refinements, modification, and secondary design in the context of 
their use.  
Hard disciplines such as mathematics and physics aside, singular and permanent solutions 
to problems do not exist in most disciplines. In the social sciences and professions, a solution is a 
model or representation of the world that works better than other models for achieving a desired 
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outcome or mediating a problem instance within a broad problem domain. Design models are 
context dependent knowledge bundles (technological rules) among a set of possible alternative 
contrast-classes which are expected to achieve an expected outcome relevant to a particular set of 
requirements derived from a specific problem domain. Models are considered better relative to 
other models through fulfillment of specific measurement criteria and by the context of the 
person formulating the problem. Thus a manager may implement a technology that selectively 
benefits a subset of stakeholders, while at the same time increasing problems for other actors. 
Design models therefore identify the contrast-classes of solutions, and then define the relevance 
relations (van Fraassen 1980; Hovorka et al. 2008) of subjectively selected criteria of the 
stakeholders championing the design project. As changes in context, task, or stakeholders occur, 
the original alternatives and requirements may expose the opportunity for secondary-design or 
the creation of workarounds. Therefore the technological rule was not a solution as much as a 
temporarily better state of continuously changing affairs. 
This argument may seem obvious as DSR, like all research, is progressive, and 
technological rules at the primary design phase will change over time. But the rhetorical shift 
from solution to mediation is a necessary part of understanding the role of pragmatism as an 
alternative perspective for evaluation in DSR. The ongoing process of secondary design suggests 
that information systems do not solve a problem but instead provide mediation of information 
processes between desired states of being (goals) and current states. The designed artifact 
provides a potential for human action (Winograd and Flores 1986) which may include the 
creation and attachment of meaning, increased capacity for idea generation, or emancipation from 
organizational structures, in addition to purely rational functionalist measures of utility. But the 
technology itself does not provide a final solution, or even fulfill necessary or sufficient 
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conditions of a solution. A successful design may offer a model for change and human action 
towards a more positive outcome in specific problem domains. This stance is more aligned with a 
pragmatist philosophy (Goldkhul 2004; Goldkhul 2005) than the DSR rational functionalist 
perspective. After implementation of a specific artifact, refined models, which mediate human 
action when faced with specific problem instances in the domain, will be offered, and each one 
will be modified, redesigned, or worked-around, as contexts, actors, and tasks change.  
This seemingly obvious observation conceals the underlying philosophical shift from the 
rational functionalist perspective of DSR, in which success is evaluated in terms of utility-based 
goals, to a pragmatic perspective where the information systems may be evaluated as successful 
(or unsuccessful) due to unanticipated or intangible effects not specified in the original design, 
and on the ability of the system to support human action.  Rational functionalism emphasizes the 
technology impact as measured by productivity and effectiveness of work practices whereas 
pragmatism considers the rearrangement of things and people and the way in which artifacts 
perturb the assemblages of technologies, people, and work processes (Coyne 1995; Latour 1995). 
However, it is important to recognize that pragmatic is not the same as utilitarian. Pragmatism 
posits the researcher or the stakeholder requesting the designed artifact has values dependent on 
their own interpretation of the relevance and important evaluative measures associated with their 
purposes (Goles and Hirschheim 2000). 
To examine evaluation in more detail, we must first consider whether we are evaluating the 
artifact based upon the criteria determined by the designers, or based upon how actors actually 
interact with the built artifacts. 
ENCOUNTERING DESIGN 
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One implication of the artifact-centric conceptualization of DSR is the belief that “people 
will encounter technology as something that is encountered just as it was designed, to be 
appropriated or incorporated into practice” (Dourish 2006 p 6).  This is stated quite directly in the 
position that DSR does not attend to the actors using the technology nor to the manner in which 
the technology or work practices are modified over time (Hevner et al. 2004). Researchers 
following these guidelines are likely to privilege the technical artifact over an evaluation of social 
processes, secondary design, or emergent benefits in their theorizing. But numerous researchers 
have noted the common phenomena of users redesigning technologies and the practices 
supported by the technologies as part of their practice (Latour 1995; Robey and Boudreau 1999; 
Ciborra 2002).  Research in Human Computer Interaction has long recognized that designed 
systems often do not match the needs of the people using the system. MacLean et al. (1990) note 
that it is impossible to design systems which will fulfill the goals of all users in all situations. 
Dourish (2001) suggests that the designers do not share the same model of the task domain as the 
users. Unique functions and applications are created as systems are used in ways that the 
designers did not anticipate (Winograd and Flores 1986). Design theories are representations or 
models of the designer’s view of the problem domain and the artifact that will mediate human 
action in that domain. If human actions are over-determined, such that the coupling of the system 
actions to the situated world is too rigid or incomplete, by necessity end-users will modify the 
information process to complete their realized, in situ work.  Human agency and learning play a 
large role in enactment of technology (Boudreau and Robey 2005). Human actors who tailor 
information processes are acting as secondary designers in the ongoing creation and recreation of 
information environments. This is fundamental human activity but currently not recognized in 
most design theorizing. Although guidelines for design theory fall short of creating theories that 
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account for the end-users’ reflections, tinkering, and subsequent tailoring of information systems 
in a process of secondary design, an even larger problem is presented in the evaluation phase of 
DSR.   
Secondary Design 
The belief that artifacts are encountered just as they were designed has resulted in IS 
research evaluating workers’ deviation from prescribed uses of information systems and the 
creation of workarounds as resistance. Yet the same research calls upon designers, developers, 
and managers to develop adaptable and reconfigurable systems that can accommodate a wider 
variety of user behaviors and tasks (Ferneley and Sobreperez 2006). As an increasing number of 
design models are conceptualized as information environments where actors engage in 
information processes through reflection and action  and engage in secondary design 
(Germonprez et al. 2007; Hovorka and Germonprez 2009), the evaluation of the artifact solely by 
the initial criteria risks undervaluing innovative system modifications (Ciborra 2002).  
Actors tailor systems and practices during use for many reasons. One reason for secondary 
design is the actor’s desire that the designed artifact enable them to accomplish their own goals.  
But it is unlikely that their goal coincides with the highly functionalist and rational goals upon 
which the artifact was designed/built and upon which evaluation will be based. Few knowledge 
workers are thinking to themselves how efficient, profitable, or even how useful the artifact is. 
Research from phenomenological perspectives (Boland 1984; Introna and Whittaker 2002) and 
from pragmatic perspectives (Goles and Hirschheim 2000; Goldkhul 2005) reveal that 
technology users may be motivated by pragmatic reasons such as;  ‘this is the only information 
systems available’;  ‘this will work if I tailor the system to shortcut three steps’; ‘or my modified  
procedure makes more sense to me than the designed process.’  
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A second reason for secondary-design comes from the limitation of designers to fully 
comprehend the conditions of use. All models and evaluations are based on objects and attributes 
preselected by the designer. The motivation for the design model, and the rational for how the 
designer arrived at that model, is absent from the actual instantiation. When the actor is incapable 
of achieving desired goals with the technology because the task demands placed on the artifact 
are different than the original model, a breakdown has occurred and there is no basis for the 
artifact, as designed, to operate (Winograd and Flores 1986). The only way to generate a new 
model or representation is from the actor’s experience, which is outside the artifact’s original 
design realm. Furthermore, many innovative processes, and the creation of new knowledge, are 
unexpected consequences of use. In the implementation and secondary-design of technologies, 
many system features and user behaviors emerge which are not within the scope of the original 
specifications (Ciborra 2002). Evaluation of design success must include the ability to recognize 
beneficial outcomes that are idiosyncratic, unplanned and emergent. It is evident that it is 
impossible for a primary design effort to completely specify all possible system uses ex ante.  
Therefore the current conceptualization of DSR brings forth a tension between our desire 
for a rational and emotionless logic through which information technologies are designed and 
evaluated, contrasted with real human actors who encounter those technologies in situated and 
emotion-laden practice. An examination of variable-centered IS research notes that, in most 
studies, the actors or managers who might benefit from the research are not represented in the 
study (Ramiller and Pentland 2009). In the same way, design science research neglects the actors 
who will be using, subjected to, and whose work processes will be evaluated through the rational 
lens of the technology. The actions themselves, the meaning of the actions attached by the actors 
for whom the system is designed, and the embodied participation of use, are expunged and not 
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accounted for in the design or evaluation. Although researchers recognize that technology and 
action are inseparable in information system design  (Hevner et al. 2004), the current view of 
evaluation is hampered by a narrow definition of design which produces an appliance mentality 
of design (Lee 2001) and  a rational functionalist view of evaluation which does not account for 
the secondary design of the system in practice. A critical extension to design science research for 
both the design and evaluation phases is to incorporate the tendency of people to tinker, tweak, 
tailor, and otherwise modify the system to fit their particular context (Ciborra 2002; Dourish 
2006; Hovorka and Germonprez 2009). 
EVALUATION 
DSR explicitly incorporates evaluation as one of the essential guidelines, yet it is an 
impoverished view of evaluation based upon a narrow functionalist perspective which defines 
successful design only in terms of utility, quality, and efficacy of technological artifacts (Hevner 
et al. 2004) and thin epistemological grounding. Systematic testing is often achieved by treating 
the model as a black box, and by linking its use to specific outcomes (van Aken 2004). This is a 
very pragmatic philosophy interested in change and action (Goldkhul 2005) which is not 
concerned with causality or the explanatory truth of theories (Gregor 2006; Hovorka et al. 2008). 
But DSR recognizes that models can also be tested scientifically, whereby the functionality and 
use of the artifact can be explained and predicted. But phenomena such as secondary design 
(Germonprez et al. 2007; Hovorka and Germonprez 2009) and the separation between a user 
encountering an artifact and the original design specifications, makes evaluation from a solely 
functionalist perspective problematic. Difficulties arise in rigorous scientific testing of design 
theory in situ where pragmatic evaluation vies with rational functionalist requirements. If the 
DSR approach is extended to other areas of research such as management or organizational 
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studies (Romme 2003; van Aken 2004) for the purpose of creating knowledge, then evaluation 
becomes a cornerstone of its legitimacy.  
To address this evaluation problem, Baskerville et al. (2007) introduce the idea of soft 
design science research, which includes a multi-stage  evaluation process. But the proposed 
framework is fully embedded in the rational functionalist paradigm of meeting articulated  
requirements. The framework does suggest that the determination of success and of failures is 
complex, and includes multiple perspectives by multiple stakeholders as well as the attribution of 
failure to externalities rather than design.  
The exposition of an organizational information system case presented in Baskerville et al. 
(2007) illustrates the difficulties presented by incommensurate perspectives on evaluation. 
Although the study artifact was originally evaluated to be a success, changes in context (new 
managers who were not as well known or trusted by upper management) led to subversion of the 
information system and its eventual removal because it had become socially destructive 
(Baskerville and Land 2004). It is important to recognize that the philosophy underlying the 
evaluative criteria shifted during the time period in question. Even as the system became socially 
destructive, it was still capable of meeting the original functionalist goals of delivering 
information to senior executives. This suggests that the original requirements were 
instrumentalist in nature, but the later evaluation emphasized a pragmatic perspective of the 
ability of the system to support human actions over time. Although it is useful to classify 
evaluation errors in a typology of errors (Baskerville et al. 2007), it is equally important to 
recognize that the philosophical basis upon which evaluation is based and whether it is 
commensurate with the design paradigms.  
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It comes as no surprise that shifting paradigms for evaluation will result in conflicting 
results, particularly if the context, task, or stakeholders have also changed. Adopting a pragmatic  
desire to create artifacts that work or that have beneficial mediation of human action (Goldkhul 
2004) conflicts with the functionalist, radical, or critical paradigms under which the systems may 
have been developed (Hirschheim and Klein 1989). The risk is in not recognizing the paradigm in 
which the design was created and the paradigm from which we are evaluating a built artifact. 
The discussion above reinforces and extends the argument that broadening of evaluation to 
include interpretative or critical approaches capable of capturing outcomes not included in the 
original utility-based performance measures, necessarily requires a shift from rational 
functionalist paradigms to other evaluative approaches. Interpretive (Boland 1978; Niehaves 
2007) or phenomenological approaches (Introna and Whittaker 2002) inform initial design and 
also evaluation by uncovering the ontology of the actual work (Suchman et al. 1999; Butler and 
Murphy 2007) and viewing the technology through the actor’s eyes. Although it is recognized 
that organizational actors learn and modify processes or technologies to better fit their actual 
work (Robey and Boudreau 1999), from the functionalist perspective of the artifact this is 
resistance (Lapointe and Rivard 2005) and a failure of the IS. But from an interpretive or critical 
perspective respectively, it may represent an actor’s creation of identity or liberation from 
organizational strictures. Our understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of evaluation in 
DSR can be broadened to recognize and incorporate different, clearly defined criteria that will 
extend the domains in which DSR is a legitimate approach to knowledge creation. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This research has sought to clarify three implications of expanding the predominantly 
functionalist DSR approach to knowledge creation into broader organizational and societal 
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research domains. Whereas the DSR approach has enormous potential for knowledge creation in 
a variety of domains, care must be taken to comprehend and articulate the philosophical 
underpinnings of theory building and evaluation to avoid grounding knowledge on unwarranted 
amalgamations of paradigm-bound concepts and the creation of incoherent design theory. While 
design theory development may be influenced by more than one paradigm, and can be evaluated 
from multiple perspectives, awareness of the need for clarity when grounding design theory in 
multiple kernel theories or potentially incommensurate concepts will strengthen the legitimacy of 
DSR. 
First, design theories of artifacts, be they instantiations, algorithms, managerial programs, 
constructs, or organizational structures, are all models for enabling human action and change. 
These models are not descriptions or explanations of states of being which exist, but rather are 
models of “new ways of being that did not previously exist and a framework for action that 
would not have previously made sense” (Winograd and Flores 1986 p 177). This aspect of DSR 
is a strongly pragmatic activity wherein pragmatism is concerned with goal-oriented action. 
Significantly, the design models exist within a spectrum of alternative models which do not have 
a verifiable truth-value, but rather can each satisfy a variety of pre-defined or emergent goals. We 
can only say that this design is better than the alternatives models against a background of the 
particular interpretation of conditions declared as better by an individual or community. 
Second, by focusing attention of the composite nature of design theories, this research 
identifies the risk of grounding design theory on disparate explanatory kernel theories which 
themselves may be based upon distinct philosophical stances. The risk is not that the built artifact 
would not work. Rather the risk lies in confounding our understanding of why the design works, 
as we look to the kernel theories upon from which the new theory was derived. Ontologically 
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incommensurate assumptions or conceptual conflicts in kernel theories will result in a design that 
may be pragmatically beneficial but atheoretic. We cannot assume that incommensurate kernel 
theories are operating in conjunction or in opposition. In fact we cannot assume anything about 
the interactions of such theories! By concatenating theories with disparate ontological or 
epistemological assumptions, we lose coherence of the derived design theory or design 
principles. The epistemic distance between the new design theory and the kernel theories upon 
which it is grounded precludes and direct refinement or validation of kernel theory. In addition, 
the pragmatist emphasis on change and action, rather than the rationalist emphasis on truth and 
explanation, requires considerable discrimination to advance design knowledge while evaluating 
the in situ use of a new artifact. Whereas knowledge is often perceived as an increasingly 
accurate  reflection of reality, pragmatism recognizes that to achieve goals, humans must perceive 
what features can be afforded practical action, while often neglecting to invoke basic science 
(Bunge 1996; Goldkhul 2005).  
Third, the tension between rational functionalist evaluation, based upon utility and 
efficiency, and the pragmatist emphasis on human action and change, contribute to confounding 
evaluations of artifacts and design theories. The evaluation phase of DSR must be firmly 
grounded and should not meander between pragmatic, functionalist, critical, and interpretative 
paradigms. Evaluation may flow from any of these positions, and will result in quite different 
evaluative outcomes depending on the contrast-class between models of reality and the relevant 
criteria of the evaluator. The conditions of satisfactory performance or fit are not necessarily 
determinate in advance, but may emerge during the development of the human-artifact 
interaction. Secondary design in the context of use and changes in the environment of use itself 
may further complicate evaluation. But the multiple goals of DSR during the design/build – 
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justify/evaluate process are often at odds and may lead to inconsistent results. Greater rhetorical 
precision is required to insure that the paradigmatic grounding of design and evaluation phases 
are clearly articulated. 
This research does not attempt to settle the longstanding discussion between those who 
would isolate paradigms and pluralists who recommend a diversity of paradigms and research 
methods. Most social sciences have accepted that there is a diversity of opinions about what is 
knowable and how we can know something exists (Scherer 1998; Mingers 2001; Tadajewski 
2008). Nor does this research privilege particular research paradigms. Rather, it suggests that, as 
DSR is expanded across IS and into other organizational and social domains as an approach to 
knowledge creation and evaluation, researchers must recognize and surface their paradigmatic 
assumptions, boundaries, and limitations. To assume-away or to simply ignore the significant 
debates surrounding the production and validation of knowledge would be a disservice to Design 
Science Research and reduce its validity as a process of knowledge creation.   
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